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Abstract 
  This paper develops an informational model of litigation in which court decisions are a function of 
legal representation.  In this model, resource constraints determine how much parties expend on legal 
representation.  The allocation of resources across parties influences court decisions in two important 
ways.  First, in individual cases the party with greater resources can produce more information, thereby 
increasing her probability of a favorable decision by the court.  Second, as the cost of litigation increases 
relative to parties’ resources, courts have less information upon which to make decisions.  We model the 
evolution of precedent as a dynamic externality under stare decisis. These factors determine the 
evolution of legal precedent. In areas of law in which parties on a particular side have persistently greater 
resources, the law is likely to evolve in a direction that favors that side.  The extent of information 




  Most economic models of litigation ignore limitations on parties’ ability to pay the costs of 
legal representation.  This article explores the role that parties’ resources have on legal 
outcomes when one side has more resources than the other or litigation costs are relatively high.  
In particular, this article examines how the allocation of resources and costs between parties 
affects outcomes in individual cases and, over time, legal precedent. 
  While largely overlooked in the economic literature, resource constraints are a common 
issue facing litigants.  Defendants typically have fewer resources than prosecutors in criminal 
cases (Luban, 1993).  In civil cases, individual litigants generally have fewer resources to litigate 
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than corporations (Hadfield, 2000).  At the extreme, resource constraints may force parties to 
forego lawyers and represent themselves in litigation.  This phenomenon is not restricted to the 
poor, but extends to the middle class as well (Gibbs 2008), often for complex legal matters 
(Glater, 2009). 
  Richard Posner (1973) has famously argued that the common law is efficient, whereby the 
market for litigation accepts efficient rules and challenges inefficient ones.  Over time, legal 
precedent converges towards greater efficiency, allowing parties to resolve disputes by 
bargaining in the shadow of the law (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979). 
  Given the infrequency of trials (Galanter 1994; Eaton et al 2005), the primary focus of 
economic models of litigation has understandably been on settlement.  Early scholarship on 
settlement (Landes 1971; Gould 1973) highlighted parties’ incentive to settle in order to avoid 
the costs of trial and the delay in resolution.  This work led to seminal formal models of 
litigation (Shavell 1982a, 1982b) as a choice between settlement and trial.  Subsequent 
scholarship built on this early work by introducing asymmetric information and the factors that 
influence the likelihood (P’ng 1983) and terms of settlement (Bebchuk 1984).  Subsequent 
scholarship offered important refinements by modeling different types of private information 
and their effect on settlement outcomes (Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Schweizer 1989; Daughety 
and Reinganum 1994; Spier 1994a, 1994b).  Common to these models is a framework where 
settlement outcomes are a function of parties’ expectations at trial with respect to both outcome 
and litigation costs.  By backward induction, most litigants settle. 
  Litigation can be thought of a competition in which parties commit effort or resources to 
prevail in a given case.  There is a rich literature on contests (Tulloch 1980, 1985; Dixit 1987), 
including how legal presumptions affect whether and how parties engage in litigation 
(Bernardo, Talley & Welch 2000).  
  Because their focus was on understanding settlement, these models largely ignore the 
costs of legal representation.1  Litigation costs, while included in these models, are exogenously 
assigned to the parties.  More significantly, these models assume that parties have the resources 
to pay these legal fees.  Subsequent attempts to explain the dynamic decision-making of 
litigation expenditures relax the first condition but retain the second (Katz 1988).  In effect, 
                                                      
1 In addition, most models assume lumpy litigation costs (Spier, 2002), incurred mostly at trial, 
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parties in these models are making a discrete determination whether to incur litigation costs, 
not a continuous determination regarding the amount. 
  The focus of this article departs from the previous models in three important ways.  First, 
while other models describe settlement, this model describes court decisions.  Second, this 
model seeks to explain legal precedent, not optimization of the parties themselves.  Third, 
parties’ decisions in this model are influenced not by their preferences, but by their constraints.  
  Why our interest in the development of legal precedent?  In a common law system, legal 
rules in several areas of the law are created through court decisions.  Over a series of decisions, 
the courts develop legal rules that affect not simply parties to these decisions, but prospective 
litigants as well.   Our model is a partial equilibrium model in that we abstract away from the 
decision as to whether to litigate at the appellate level.  Even though it is well established that 
parties “bargain in the shadow of the law” (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979), courts nonetheless 
continue to hear many trials and appeals.  In 2008, the federal appeals courts alone rendered 
nearly 30,000 opinions on cases decided on the merits.  More than 5,000 of these cases resulted 
in published opinions expounding on how the law applied to the given facts (2008 Judicial 
Business of the U.S. Courts, 2009).  Court decisions in this respect are generally viewed as a 
public good, in part because they apply to everyone, regardless of their participation in the 
actual cases.   
  What is often overlooked, however, is that the production function of court decisions 
consists in large part of private expenditures by the parties themselves.  Recent scholarship 
provides support that parties’ quality of lawyer have a significant effect on case outcomes 
(Abrams and Yoon, 2007).  Not surprisingly, parties often expend significant resources to hire 
lawyers to present their claims to the court (Hadfield, 2000).  But resources for litigation are 
finite and heterogeneously distributed across parties, many of whom are unable to spend the 
same resources as the opposing party.  This model examines how parties’ resource constraints 
influence case outcomes and, through a series of decisions, the evolution of legal precedent 
itself. 
  The paper proceeds as follows:  Part 2 develops a model in which the parties’ resources 
determine their expenditures for legal representation.  In turn, each party’s expenditures, in 
conjunction with the given facts of the case and existing law, determine the probability that the 
court will rule in her favor.  The more that a party spends on legal representation – all things 
equal – the greater the probability of a favorable outcome.  The parties’ limits on expenditures Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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may generate decisions that differ from how the court would decide if parties did not face these 
resource constraints.  The greater the costs of litigation relative to the parties’ resources, the 
greater the variability of the court’s decisions.  This allocation of resources and costs potentially 
play an important role in development of legal precedent. 
  Part 3 illustrates through simulations how the constraint and cost parameters influence the 
development of legal precedent.  Part 4 evaluates how the model in light of actual litigation, 
relaxing some of the model’s assumptions.  Part 5 summarizes the results and discusses broader 
implications of the model on litigation.  Part 6 concludes. 
 
 
Part 2: Model 
  Framework: The following is a model of legal precedent.  Although legal precedent can 
emerge at the trial level, this model focuses primarily on outcomes at the appellate level, where 
decisions are more likely to published and therefore where most precedent is established 
(Pershbacher & Bassett, 2004).  It looks only at disputes resolved by formal adjudication by the 
court, for which the court issues a published opinion.2  A case involves a dispute between two 
parties, a plaintiff (P) and a defendant (D), each of who retains a lawyer3 to represent her during 
litigation.  Each party has the same objective: a favorable decision by the court.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume the court is a unitary actor.  
  Each case involves a set of facts, F.  The model assumes that, while the court decides cases 
that collectively spans several areas of law, each F pertains to a particular and single area of law, 
L.4  L is represented by a single-dimensional space, where L ∈ [0,1].  Each F is located at a point 
along L and therefore F ∈ [0,1].  For both L and F, the range represents a normalized 
distribution of facts that can be ordered along a single dimensional space.   
  The position of F along L is determined by the case during the trial phase, and hence is 
exogenous to the appellate process.  At trial, the parties argue questions of fact as well as law; 
                                                      
2 Although this is a model of court decisions, it does not assume or require that all disputes 
require formal adjudication by the courts.  It recognizes that parties often settle, but – as 
discussed below – assumes that they do so only when the case presents facts previously 
resolved by the court.  We relax these assumptions in Part 4. 
3 Legal representation includes all work conducted by the lawyers, including but not limited to 
gathering of facts, depositions, selection and preparation of witnesses. 
4 The model assumes that cases raise only one area or doctrine of law.  As we discuss in Part 4, 
we recognize that in actual litigation, cases often involve multiple areas or doctrine of law. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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on appeal, the model assumes that the court accepts the facts as established below.5 
Accordingly, the parties on appeal are not arguing where F is situated along L, but rather the 
legal determination of the lower court, given F.  We also assume that the court shows no 
deference to the lower court’s findings of law and reviews these questions de novo.  In other 
words, the model assumes that appellate cases before the court involve only questions of law, 
rather than questions of fact.6   
  Parties in this model litigate cases under the adversarial system - existing most notably in 
the United States and England – where each party is responsible for presenting arguments 
before the court.  The court plays a largely passive role in the production of these arguments: it 
may raise procedural (e.g., jurisdiction) issues sua sponte, but are generally loath to do so for 
substantive issues.  Judicial discretion occurs primarily in evidentiary issues regarding 
admissibility (Cheng and Yoon, 2005).  In so doing, the court follows the judicial norm of 
“active parties and an inactive court.” (Note, 1966).   
  Before the court, the lawyers for P and D produce arguments that depict F in a light most 
favorable to their respective clients.  After the presentation of arguments, the court issues a 
decision, which identifies the prevailing party and the decision, given F.  In so doing, the model 
captures court decisions as a discrete outcome (e.g., prevailing party; legality of F), not a 
continuous one (e.g., magnitude of remedy; degree of culpability).  
  The model assumes that the interests of the parties and the court are narrowly defined by 
the present case.  The parties argue about a particular outcome only as it relates to F and not 
another set of facts.  Similarly, consistent with principles of judicial restraint (Merrill, 2005; 
Schaurer, 2006), the court decides only F, and does not attempt in its decision to rule on a 
different or broader set of facts. 
  Judicial Decisions and the Development of Legal Precedent: At common law, judicial opinions 
serve individual and social objectives.  Regarding the former, the court provides formal 
adjudication for the parties to the case.  As for the latter, the court provides guidance through 
                                                      
5 This comports with the practices of most jurisdictions, in which appellate courts review show 
deference to lower courts’ findings of fact, typically under an arbitrariness or abuse of discretion 
standard (Miles and Sunstein, 2008). 
6 In actual litigation, lawyers argue questions of fact as well as law.  But in appellate matters, 
courts are highly deferential to lower courts’ determination of facts (e.g., review questions of 
fact for abuse of discretion) and focus on questions of law. This focus on law, not facts, typically 
occurs at the appellate level, although in some instances it happens at trial (i.e., summary 
judgment). Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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its decisions to prospective parties involved in similar disputes, serving as productive capital 
stock (Landes & Posner, 1976).  The focus of this model is on the social objective. 
  Each decision by the court establishes judicial precedent.  The model assumes a strong 
form of stare decisis.  Unlike a legislature, the court in each decision is required to be internally 
consistent with prior decisions.  Accordingly, subsequent cases involving the same F must 
adhere to the court’s earlier determination.7  Parties cannot ask the court to reach an outcome 
that is contrary to earlier decisions.  In our model, stare decisis actually precludes repetition of 
cases with identical facts: once an appellate court makes a decision regarding a given set of 
facts, it does not reconsider it, either on additional appeal or in a subsequent case.   
  Legal precedent places an additional restriction: a court’s decision for a given F may also 
dictate the court’s decisions involving other facts that the court may not have even heard, and 
therefore obviate the need for the court to hear such subsequent cases.  We elaborate on this 
point shortly. 
  It is worth repeating that our model differs from most economic models of litigation.  In 
most models, a plaintiff will bring suit if her expected gross return exceeds the costs of taking 
the case to trial; and parties will forego trial if their expected returns from settling exceed those 
of going to trial (Spier, 2007).  Priest and Klein (1984) famously hypothesized that trials reflect 
cases of mutual uncertainty, where the probability of either party winning is 50 percent.8  
Common throughout these models is that parties make litigation decisions based on personal 
utility.  In our model, we take the decision to litigate to be exogenous.  
  At time t=0, the court has yet to provide precedent for L.  All of L is unsettled at t=0: for 
any set of facts, parties do not know how the court would decide.  But with each decision, the 
court establishes a precedent that reduces the unsettled space of L, which has lower bound L, 
and upper bound,  .9  At any time t, the unsettled space (between Lt and  ) involves facts that 
                                                      
7 This assumption is of course does not reflect the subtleties of appellate litigation.  Most 
appellate courts have mandatory rather than discretionary dockets, meaning parties have the 
right to appeal.  As a result, appellate courts may hear cases that raise no new issues of fact, law, 
or either.  At the same time, however, appellate courts at both the state and federal level have a 
practice of unpublished opinions – written opinions that are issued for the exclusive benefit of the 
interested parties – which do not carry precedential significance for subsequent parties 
(Weisgerber, 2009). 
8 Several scholars have theoretically and empirically explored the Priest-Klein hypothesis.  For 
an excellent summary, see Waldfogel (1998).  
9 At time t=0, L = 0 and   = 1. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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the court has not yet decided.  By contrast, the settled space (below Lt and above  ) involves 
facts that the court has already decided, either directly or by implication through a prior case.  
  Whether the court hears a case depends on the location of Ft relative to Lt and  .  If Ft 
falls within the settled space, such that Ft<Lt, or Ft> , then by definition, legal precedent has 
determined the legal outcome for Ft, and stare decisis applies. When this occurs, the parties look 
to the court’s prior decisions and settle the case.  In other words, parties bargain in the shadow 
of the law (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979), settling when the case raises no new issues of fact 
and law. 
  If Ft falls within the unsettled space, Lt<Ft< , then the parties proceed to trial, after 
which the court decides in favor of P or D.  Each decision reduces the unsettled space of L by 
moving either L or   to Ft, depending on the prevailing party.  In the model, we arbitrarily 
choose that the court ruling in favor of P shifts Lt upward, and a ruling in favor of D shifts   
downward.  Accordingly, the decision sets a new precedent such that if P wins, the new bounds 
are [Lt+1=Ft,  ]; and if D wins the new bounds are [Lt+1=L,  ].  The court does not 
decide cases involving facts in the settled space, even if it has not explicitly heard the specific 
facts.  By implication, the court through its earlier decisions has already determined how the 
court would decide cases within the settled space.  If one or both of the parties is dissatisfied 
with the decision, they appeal.  The highest decision from which a decision is publishes 
establishes precedent.10 
  In addition to being exogenous to the model, the selection of each given F is randomly 
determined. The sequence by which cases appear before the court and how the court decides 
them, however, has a potentially dramatic effect on legal precedent.  Drawing from initial 
model, suppose for the first case involving L, F=0.95.  If the court rules in favor of D, then   
shifts downward to 0.95.  Most of L remains unsettled [L=0,  =0.95].  If, however, the court 
rules in favor of P, then L shifts upward to 0.95.  Now, most of L is settled, with the unsettled 
space only [L=0.95,  =1].    
  As the number of precedents increase in L, the unsettled space between Lt and   grows 
smaller, converging to zero.  The court continues to hear cases involving new facts until  
                                                      
10 We recognize the strong assumptions regarding case selection for appeal, which are both 
under and over-inclusive in light of actual appellate litigation.  In Part 4 we discuss the 
implications of relaxing these assumptions. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Lt -  ≈0.  In the process, these precedents converge towards a legal rule, S ∈ [0,1] – such that 
[Lt=S,  =S].  S serves as a cut-point where legal precedent dictates that all F < S will be 
decided in favor of P, and all F > S will be decided in favor of D.  Because of stare decisis, over 
time L is monotonically increasing,   is monotonically decreasing, and the unsettled space 
between L and   is converging towards zero. 
  The Influence of Resources and Costs on Decisions:  Case outcomes are a function of the facts 
of the given case and existing legal precedent (Posner, 1973).  Parties expend resources to 
litigate, typically through retaining lawyers.  Implicit in our model is the belief that the quality 
of legal representation matters.  Robert Frost artfully captured the significance of legal 
representation when he remarked, “A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide who has 
the better lawyer” (Gillers, 2002).  Our model extends the existing models of litigation by having 
court decisions depend on parties’ expenditures on legal representation.   
   The model distinguishes S from S*.  We stated earlier that S is the convergence point of 
legal precedent in L over a series of decisions, given the allocation of resources and costs 
between parties.  By contrast, S* is the convergence point in L, assuming both an equal 
allocation of resources between parties and sufficiently low costs of litigation.  Under these 
conditions, precedents converge to a point where [Lt=S*, =S*].  While it is possible that S=S*, 
our model does not assume it.  Our central interest are the factors which likely cause S to 
diverge from S*. 
  Intuitively, one can think of S* as a gravitational point.  The strength of its attraction 
depends on several factors, including existing social and political norms, as well as legal 
precedent in other areas of the law.  For example, societal beliefs about due process and equal 
protection may influence how the court decides cases across several areas of law.  Three 
important caveats:  First, the model does not make any normative or efficiency claims about S*.  
Second, S* is not the objective of any of the actors in the model.  The parties’ interests are to 
prevail on appeal, given F, and these interests may be indirect conflict with S*; the court’s 
interest is to decide F, and only F.  Third, the model does not assume that the parties or the 
court is even aware of S* with any precision.   
  Stated formally: at time t, case outcomes are a function of five factors: 1) F; 2) L and  ; 3) 
S*; 4) RP and RD, the resources available to each party for legal representation; and 5) EP and ED, Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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the effort of resources spent in litigation.  We now describe the relationships among these 
parameters. 
  The effort in litigating a case for P and D – EP and ED, respectively – depends on the 












  (1) 
 
Equation 1 captures the relationship between the given facts of the case and the arguments that 
increase the probability that a party prevails.  For P, the expression (F – L) in the numerator 
signifies that the closer F is to L, the less effort required by P to persuade the court to decide in 
its favor.  The intuition here is the influence of legal precedent:  P has a greater probability of 
prevailing when she can show that the current facts closely relate to a prior case in which that 
plaintiff also prevailed.  Accordingly, the smaller is (F – L), the lower is P’s costs. 
  The expression |L – S*| in the denominator signifies that P will find it less costly to 
persuade the court to rule in its favor the farther L is from S*.  As the distance between L and S* 
increases, EP decreases.  The non-case-related factors that affect the evolution of the law increase 
the gravitational pull of S* the further it is away from L.  The intuition here is that P finds it 
more challenging – and hence more costly – to persuade the court to reach decisions contrary to 
S*.  It is worth noting that S* influences litigation costs, even if legal precedent has evolved such 
it precludes the legal rule converging to S* itself.  The functional form assures that the 
“gravitational pull” is relatively greater at whichever boundary of the law is farther from S*, as 
welling as keeping E positive.  We describe in greater detail the construction of S* in the 
appendix. 
  The cost parameter is determined by two additional positive parameters, cm and w.  The 
first, cm, is the marginal cost of litigation given existing precedent.11  For P, as cm increases, so 
too does EP. The second, w, captures the strength of the gravitational pull.  As w increases, EP 
also increases.  More importantly, if w is sufficiently large, then E falls rapidly the further L is 
from S*, increasing the gravitational pull towards S*.  Holding the other parameters constant, 
an increase in either cm or w – or both – increases the parties’ litigation costs. 
                                                      
11 For example, the cost of litigating a complex torts case (e.g., carcinogenic products) will likely 
be more expensive than litigating an ordinary personal injury tort. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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  The ability of parties to pay the costs of legal representation depends on their resources 
allocated to the case, RP and RD.  Standard economic theory suggests that parties will spend on 
litigation up until the point that their marginal return of doing so is zero.  The model, however, 
is agnostic about the mechanism that determines the resources devoted to litigation:  RP and RD 
simply reflect what the parties have allocated to spend, which may or may not be the same as 
what they are would prefer to spend.  A gap between the parties’ actual and preferred 
allocation depends on a range of factors, including risk-aversion, expenditures by the opposing 
party, and resource constraints. 
  Together with EP and ED, RP and RD determine the ability of the parties to make legal 
arguments before the court. 
 
  (2) 
 
In Equation 2, Q represents an index of the quality and quantity of legal arguments.   We 
assume that the court cares primarily about the quality of arguments raised by the parties.  All 
things equal, however, the court benefits from a greater number of arguments.  It is important 
to note that the unit cost of argument is not necessarily the same for each party: EP and ED 
weights the arguments that the parties are trying to make for F relative to L or  , and S*.  This 
weighting comports with the intuition that when the facts and legal precedent weigh heavily 
against the position a party is seeking, her lawyer’s task is more challenging, and therefore 
more costly.  






The party that produces more Q has a greater probability of prevailing.  We have structured the 
outcome to be probabilistic, not deterministic, to allow for random factors (e.g., court 
misinterpretation of argument; judicial ideology) to influence the outcome.  When QP = QD, Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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each party has an equal probability of a favorable opinion from the court.  If the parties have the 
same level of resources, QP = QD occurs only when F=S*. 
  Before proceeding, we note why S* is the convergence point when resources are equal.  
Consider the value QP - QD if the parties have equal resources.  Substituting from equations (1), 





As w→∞, whichever numerator term is larger becomes infinitely more important, so that party 
wins.  This forces the decision to go toward S*.  This convergence towards S* occurs not in a 
single step, but over time. That is why S* is also the gravitational point.  
  By contrast, if parties have sufficiently unequal level of resources and low costs of 
litigation, QP = QD could potentially occur anywhere F ∈ [0,1].  This possibility reflects the 
assumption in the model that parties enjoy positive returns expenditures on legal 
representation, at least in expectation.  Lastly, as the costs of litigation approaches ∞, QP ≈ QD, 
signifying that when costs of litigation are prohibitively high relative to the parties’ resources, 
they dwarf any disparity in resources between the parties. 
  This model, while a simplification of the appellate process, captures important constraints 
of the adversarial legal system, discussed above.  P and D are constrained by F and existing 
precedent (L and  ).  The parties cannot modify F or its location along L on appeal; they can 
only present it in a light most favorable to their client.12  The court, in turn, is constrained by QP 
and QD.  It must base its decision solely on the information presented by P and D’s lawyers: the 
outcome is a function of the merits of the case, but conditioned on the parties resources.   
  While focusing on resources and costs, the model highlights the role of information in 
judicial adjudication.  Legal advocacy, particularly at the appellate level, is a competition of 
ideas.  All things equal, the party that can produce stronger arguments to the court has a higher 
probability of prevailing.  But the production of arguments is costly.  With heterogeneity of 
resources, wealthier parties are at a competitive advantage over their opponents, which 
advantages them before the court, and in the development of legal precedent. 
                                                      
12 Under the canons of legal ethics, lawyers are prohibited from presenting facts they know to be 
false.  Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Notes: The horizontal axis is the log(QP-QD).  In the high information line 
Q is 10 times as large as in the low information line. 
 
Figure 1 incorporates the central ideas – resource constraints and the gravitational pull of S* – 
built into the model.  When both parties produce high levels of information, QP-QD is 
dispositive for the court in most cases, and legal precedent converges towards S* (illustrated by 
the dotted line).  Only in a narrow class of close cases does the plaintiff’s chances of prevailing 
(or losing) diverge from 0 or 1.  By contrast, when parties produce low levels of information, the 
resulting differences in Q between the parties are less dispositive (illustrated by the smooth 
line).  Compared to the plaintiff in the high-information world, the plaintiff in the low-
information world has a non-trivial probability of prevailing when F favors the defendant, and 
a non-trivial probability of losing when F favors her.  As a result, legal precedent in the low-
information world is less likely to converge to S*. 
 Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Part 3: Simulation Results  
  In Part 2, we described a model of legal precedent where courts make decisions based on 
the facts of the given case (F) and existing precedent (L;  ), but also the costs of litigating (EP; 
ED) and resources (RP; RD) of the parties.  The decisions produce legal precedent, which over 
time converge towards a rule (S).  Given these parameters, how does legal precedent evolve?  
How closely does S comport with S*?  How does the allocation of resources relative to the costs 
of litigation influence legal precedent?  In this section, we illustrate through simulations how 
different allocation resource and cost parameters influence legal precedent. 
  Convergence of Legal Precedent: In the following simulations, we arbitrarily assign S* = 0.5, 
meaning that under conditions of equal resources and sufficiently low litigation costs, legal 
precedent would converge towards S=0.5.   
  Each simulation involves a two-stage process.  In the first stage, we run a series of trials. 
For each trial, F is randomly chosen between [0,1].  If F ≤ L or F ≥  , then it is deemed to fall 
within existing precedent – therefore obviating the need for adjudication by the court – and a 
new F is chosen.  If L ≤ F ≤  , the parties proceed, producing units of argument, QP and QD 
respectively, determined by the aforementioned parameters.  
  We then compute p(P) from Equation 5 and “toss a coin” with p(P) of P winning.  If P 
wins, Lt shifts upward to F; if P loses,   shifts downward to F.  We repeat this process for 1000 
trials, during which [Lt = S,   = S].  We choose this number because it provides ample 
iterations for precedent to converge. 
  Figure 2 shows two sample convergences towards S.13  It shows that convergence occurs 
after relatively few trials.  In each panel, the parties have equal resources: in the first panel, the 
litigation costs are relatively low; in the second panel, the litigation costs are relatively high.14  
As one might expect, legal precedent has a higher probability of converging to S* when 
resources are equal and costs are low.  When resources are low relative to costs, however, legal 
precedent is less likely to converge towards S*. 
 
                                                      
13 In the Figure 2, we truncate the iterations after 1000 iterations to better show the convergence 
that occurs during the first 200 iterations. 
14 In Figure 2 and subsequent figures, we adjust litigation costs through cm.  As discussed in Part 
2, increasing either cm or w increases a party’s litigation costs, C.  Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
Please do not cite without permission. 
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Figure 2 
Convergence Towards S with Different Allocation of Resources and Costs 
 
 
  In the second step, we repeat the 1000-trial process 10,000 times.  Given the restrictive 
conditions of stare decisis and the probabilistic feature of case decisions we assume in the model, 
this repetition allows us to observe how, if at all, the distribution of 10,000 trials sets differs 
from what we observe in a single set.  In Figure 3, we show the asymptotic distribution of S 
under unequal allocation of resources and low costs of litigation (RP = 10; RD = 10; cm = 1;  
w = 1), using the initial parameter values, based on 10,000 draws of sequences of 1,000 trials. 
 Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Figure 3 
Equal Allocation of Resources, Low Costs of Litigation 
 
 
Of course, the fact that legal precedent converges to S* on average when parties have equal 
resources is not at all the same as saying that a given area of the law comes out “right,” i.e. close 
to S*.  Due to stare decisis, the outcomes depend on the stochastic path of case decisions.  In 
other words, a wrong step in the initial stages of legal precedent can have permanent 
consequences. But the more information the court has – in other words, the more resources 
parties spend or the lower the cost of information – the more likely it is that a particular path 
converges close to S*.  In Figure 2, most – but not all – cases end up very close to S*.  
  The next simulation illustrates the central point of the paper: the effect of equal versus 
unequal resources on the evolution of legal precedent.  
    Case 1: P has systematically greater resources than D:  In some areas of the law, the 
allocation of resources may differ between opposing litigants.  For example: in criminal cases, Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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the prosecution (government) in most instances has greater resources than defendants (Bright, 
1996); similarly, in housing litigation, landlords usually have greater resources than tenants 
(Scherer, 2003).  Figure 4 reports the asymptotic distribution of S under unequal allocation of 
resources and low costs of litigation (RP = 100; RD = 10; cm = 1; w = 1).    
 
Figure 4 
Unequal Allocation of Resources, Low Costs of Litigation 
 
 
  P’s significant resource advantage over D dramatically alters the evolution of legal 
precedent.  In each case, P is able to exploit its resource advantage to provide a higher index of 
information to the court, thereby increasing her probability of prevailing.  Given the magnitude 
of her resource advantage (100 to 10), P is able to prevail in most cases, irrespective of where the 
facts fall along L.  In most iterations, legal precedent diverges significantly from S*.  Generally, 
the greater P’s resource advantages over D, the greater the convergence of S towards 1.   Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
Please do not cite without permission. 
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  Case 2: P and D have randomized unequal resources:  In many areas of the law, the plaintiff 
(defendant) may not have a systematic resource advantage over the defendant (plaintiff).  We 
now consider an alternative scenario in which the allocation of resources is identical across the 
population of opposing parties but always unequal in litigation.  In this allocation, the resources 
of P are equal with D on average in the population of plaintiffs and defendants in L, but 
unequal in the pairing of parties in each case.   
  Figure 5 replicates the unequal resource setup of Figure 4, with the exception that before 
each trial we figuratively toss a fair coin to decide whether it’s the plaintiff of defendant who 
has the resource advantage.  Figure 4 runs a simulation where the two resource levels are  
[10, 100], and the cost parameters – cm = 1; w = 1 – are the same as in Figure 2: low relative to the 
resources of both parties.   
 
Figure 5 
Random Allocation of Resources, Low Costs of Litigation 
 Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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  The result in Figure 5 comports with our intuition that, with no systematic resource 
advantage enjoyed by either P or D, legal precedent will still converge around S=0.5.  In this 
respect it is similar to the convergence where parties have equal resources (Figure 2).  The 
difference is that distribution of convergence in Figure 5 is flatter and more uniform than in 
Figure 2, reflecting more iterations of trials where S converges away from S*. Ex ante, the 
disparity in resources deviations does not systematically favor one party over the other.  But in 
many iterations, S ends up favoring P or D.  Thus, even in the absence of a systematic disparity 
in resources between parties, disparities in individual cases may still produce legal rules that 
diverge from S*, in some instances significantly (e.g., S≈1; S≈0).  
  Case 3: P and D have equal resources (and high litigation costs): We began Part 3 with a 
simulation where P and D have equal resources and low costs (Figure 3).  For completeness, we 
include in Figure 6 a simulation where parties’ resources, while equal, are low relative to the 
costs of litigation.15   
 
                                                      
15 As discussed in Part 3, the convergence towards S depends not simply on the resource 
allocation between the parties, but also the costs of litigation.  C depends on the particular facts 
of the case (F) and existing precedent (F,  ), but also marginal cost of litigation (cm) and the 
gravitational pull of S* (w).  Since an increase in either cm or w increases C, in Figure 4 we 
increase just cm. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Figure 6 
Equal Allocation of Resources, High Costs of Litigation 
 
 
When litigation costs are high relative to parties’ (equal) resources, the distribution of S around 
0.5 flattens.  The average and median value of S remains ≈0.5, but the variance is considerably 
greater.  The intuition behind Figure 6 is that if litigation costs are sufficiently high relative to 
what the parties can afford, then the court will produce legal rules that in the aggregate are 
unbiased but in many iterations will not converge to S*.   
  The effect of litigation costs, if sufficiently high, holds irrespective of the allocation of 
resources between P and D.  Even if P enjoys a significant resource advantage over D, this 
resource advantage is largely negated with high costs.  Similarly, if the resource disparities is 
randomly assigned between P and D, high costs of litigation reduce the probability that legal 
precedent converges to S*.  At litigation costs exceed parties’ resources and approach ∞, Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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E(S)=S*, regardless of the allocation of resources.  Legal rules, however, appear increasingly 
stochastic along L. 
  Table 1 provides a summary table of the mean, median and variances of each of the 
figures in this section: 
 
Table 1 
Mean, Median, and Variance of S 
Case  Mean  Median  Variance 
Equal resources, 
low litigation costs 
(Figure 3) 
0.50  0.50  2.53x10-4 
Resources favor 
plaintiff,  
low litigation costs 
(Figure 4) 
0.91  0.98  1.80x10-2 
Randomly fluctuating 
resources,  
low litigation costs 
(Figure 5) 
0.50  0.50  7.80x10-2 
Equal resources,  
high litigation costs  
(Figure 6) 
0.50  0.50  9.83x10-2 
 
When one party has a significant resource advantage, legal precedent diverges far from S*.  
Moreover, if the advantage is sufficient, as in Figure 4, the variance in outcomes is low.  
Conversely, for the remaining three simulations, the median and mean convergence of S is 0.5.  
The average legal precedent converges towards S*, provided that either 1) parties have equal 
resources; 2) the allocation of resources across opposing parties is unequal but random; or 3) 
litigation costs are high relative the parties resources.  However, the variance differs 
considerably across these three states: variance is low when resources are equal and litigation 
costs are low, but (relatively) high when resource disparity is randomly unequal or litigation 
costs are high.  In other words, with random inequality of resources or high litigation costs, 
legal precedent on average does not converge to 0.5.   
 
 Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Part 4: The Model in Light of Actual Litigation 
  The model presented in Part 2 is a simplified version of legal precedent.  Some of these 
assumptions are decidedly stronger than what we observe in actual litigation, and it is worth 
discussing the predictions of the model when we relax these assumptions.   
  Contrary to the model, the court is not a unitary actor.  Litigation occurs across multiple 
jurisdictions – both state and federal – each of which has its own set of courts. Within each 
jurisdiction is a hierarchical structure of trial and appellate courts.  If jurisdictions are 
heterogeneous with respect to litigants, courts, community, it is possible that several parameters 
in the model – resources, costs, S* – may vary across jurisdictions.  Accordingly, one would 
expect legal rules to vary across jurisdictions as well, which often forms the basis for petitions 
for certiorari before the highest appellate court, at either the state or federal level.   
  In contrast to the model, stare decisis in real litigation imposes lesser constraints on both 
courts and parties.  Most appellate courts have mandatory, not discretionary dockets.  Parties 
have the right to appeal even if the case raises no new issues of fact or law.  Accordingly, it is 
entirely possible that appellate decisions involve similar or identical facts that, even if the court 
does not expressly acknowledge, appear incongruent.  More significantly, for the highest 
appellate courts, stare decisis is more of a norm, albeit a strong one, than a rule (Kim, 2007).  
Appellate courts, most notably the U.S. Supreme Court, overturn legal precedent on occasion.  
In some instances, the Supreme Court overturns its own precedent (e.g., it abolished the death 
penalty for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons (1991), reversing its earlier decision in Stanford v. 
Kentucky (1989), which allowed the death penalty for any child at least 16 years of age).  
  Judicial review mitigates the harsh consequences of legal precedent by allowing courts to 
revisit prior decisions.  A reversal in precedent may reflect error by an earlier court (e.g., 
misunderstanding the arguments) or – consistent with the informational component of the 
model – novel or stronger legal arguments made possible by greater resources by one or both of 
the parties.  For example, historians credit the involvement of the NAACP, led by Thurgood 
Marshall, in civil rights litigation leading to the Brown v. Board of Education (1954), overturning 
the “separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) (Klarman, 2004).  
  For the purpose of tractability, we assume in the model that cases involve facts pertaining 
to a single area of law.  Actual litigation often involves several areas of the law (e.g., many civil 
claims involve both matters of tort and contract), or different doctrines within an area of law 
(e.g., due process, equal protection).  In some instances the court may be able to resolve the Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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issue along a single dimension, or at least address each dimension discretely.  But in other 
instances, the court’s decision necessarily involves several areas or doctrines of law.  This multi-
dimensionality complicates the evolution of legal precedent.  Decisions that draw upon more 
than one area of law may lead to apparent inconsistencies in legal precedent if one looks at a 
single area of law.  
  It is worth noting that the number of dimensions of law may be endogenous to 
expenditures on legal representation.  It is often said that effective lawyers develop multiple 
arguments to enable their client a greater probability of prevailing.  They typically produce 
arguments in the alternative, providing the court more than one ground to find for their client.   
  Lastly, our model is agnostic about the mechanism by which parties determine their 
expenditures on legal representation.  The relationship between the amount that parties spend 
on legal representation and the amount they actually have available is an empirical question, 
but likely unanswerable, given that parties are not typically not required to report their 
financial wealth.  Given heterogeneity in resources, it is likely that parties vary in their 
willingness to spend their available resources.   
  The larger question is whether parties with unequal resources, given the opportunity to 
choose whether to litigate, would settle rather than proceed to trial.  As we discuss more fully in 
Part 5, we suspect that litigation decisions likely reflect beliefs about resources as well as merits 
of the case.  A complete answer to this question lies outside of our model, but we make the 
following observations.  First, our model suggests that disparity of resources between parties 
may in some instances actually encourage trial rather than settlement.  For example, a case in 
which QP-QD clearly favors P if both parties had equal resources may suddenly be less certain if 
D has greater resources than P.  Second, as an empirical matter, parties of unequal resources 
nonetheless litigate against one another.  A recent survey of federal judges suggests that in 
certain areas of the law (e.g., criminal, immigration, civil rights), opposing litigants vary 
dramatically in their quality of legal representation (Posner-Yoon, 2009).  
 
 
Part 5: Discussion 
  Based on the simulations in Part 3, it is worth noting that only under particular conditions 
does the distribution of legal precedent converge closely around S*: when parties have equal Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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resources and relatively low litigation costs.  Under any other allocation of resources and costs, 
there is a non-trivial possibility that legal rules diverge from S*, in many instances significantly.   
  An equal allocation of resources does not assure that legal rules converge to S*, if 
resources are low relative to the costs of litigation.  In repeated iterations, the convergence 
centers around S*, but the distribution is dispersed.  The higher the litigation costs relative to 
resources, the wider and flatter the distribution, irrespective of the allocation of resources. Even 
when resources systematically favor one side (e.g., plaintiff) over another (e.g., defendant), legal 
rules are more likely to favor the party with more resources.  But the degree of divergence from 
S* depends again on the relative cost of litigation. 
  There are two ways to describe divergence of legal precedent away from S*.  One 
divergence is variance, which can occur in one of two forms.  The first form, as illustrated 
Figure 6 and Figure 1 (solid line), is when parties provide little information to the court.16  When 
this happens, information is not dispositive for the court, and its decisions appear more 
stochastic.  The second, as illustrated by Figure 5, is with randomly fluctuating resources 
between parties.  The resource disparity inherent in each case increases the probability in each 
case that the court reaches a decision that diverges from S*.   
  The second divergence is skew, which, as illustrated by Figure 4, which occurs when one 
party has systematically higher resources than the other. When parties have systematically 
unequal resources, the expected outcome is no longer S*, but skewed above or below it 
depending on whether the allocation favors plaintiffs or defendants.  The greater the resource 
advantage, the greater is the skew away from S*. 
  Because our model is one of constraints and not utility, we are agnostic about the 
normative implications raised by variance and skew.  But it is worth a brief discussion of the 
concerns they might raise.  It is reasonable to believe that, to the extent that society prefers that 
legal precedent converges to S*, it would like to this occur not only for a single area of law, but 
across all areas.  Accordingly, if society benefits when legal precedent converges at S* and is 
harmed when it diverges from S*, then there is potentially a qualitative difference between S=S* 
and E(S)=S*.  The former does not generate harm, while the latter does whenever S≠S*.  The 
degree of harm depends on the amount of variance.  This view of variance comports with our 
                                                      
16 At the limit, if neither party provided information to the court, the QP-QD=0, and p(P)=p(D).  
In practice this would not happen, of course, since the plaintiff (in both criminal and civil cases) 
is required to provide a basis for bringing suit. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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intuition that our society prefers a legal system where courts get it “right” all (or nearly all) of 
the time over a legal system that is just as likely to to get it right as it is to get it wrong.   
  Since skew is systematic divergence from S*, it similarly generates disutility.  With respect 
to the tradeoff between variance and skew, one can imagine that society might be willing to 
accept small amounts of skew to avoid large variance in S across areas of law.  This statement, 
however, is merely suggestive, as it is outside of our model.  
  Although this paper focuses on appellate decisions, it is worth considering two broader 
effects of the allocation of resources beyond legal precedent.  First, the allocation of resources 
and costs may affect decisions at trial as well as on appeal.  At trial, parties generally argue 
questions of fact as well as law.  The allocation of resources and costs central to the appeals 
process also matter for trials.  Constructing and arguing facts is costly (e.g., identifying and 
preparing witnesses, conducting discovery, etc.).  If we allow the location of F along L to be 
endogenous at the trial stage, determined in part by the allocation of resources across parties, 
then the party with more resources is more likely to have a favorable positioning of F along L.   
As with the appellate process, the institutional design of the trial system, while facially neutral, 
can produce legal precedent that favors parties with greater resources.  Mechanisms such as 
judicial review may mitigate, but do not negate, wealth effects, particularly given the deference 
appeals courts give to trial courts on questions of fact.   
  Second, an unequal allocation of resources may deter disadvantaged parties from 
resolving their dispute through the courts, even when their case presents a new issue of law.  A 
party may decide that, despite the strength of her case on the merits, her relative lack of 
resources make it unlikely she will produce the arguments to prevail.  Instead, she settles, quite 
possibly on terms reflecting this resource disparity.  Or, even more drastic, she decides against 
bringing suit at all.  If so, cases brought to trial may reflect selection based on perceived merits 
(Priest & Klein, 1984), but conditioned on available resources.  This selection effect, depending 
on the allocation of resources across parties, may actually impede the development of legal 
precedent.  In terms of the model, it means that parts of L may remain unsettled and legal 
precedent does not converge towards S, let alone S*. 
  Ultimately, the ability of this model to tell us something about actual precedent depends 
what on what we believe is the actual allocation of resources and cost among parties.  If parties 
possess sufficient resources to litigate their case and litigation costs are sufficiently low, we have 
reason to believe that legal precedent converges in ways that may be characterized as socially Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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optimal.  This may be true in some areas such as law, such as corporate, where opposing parties 
both possess considerable resources to litigate.  Other areas, however, strongly suggest a 
systematically unequal allocation of resources, both in civil (Scherer, 2003; Abel, 2007) and 
criminal (Abrams and Yoon, 2007) cases.   
 
 
Part 6: Concluding Remarks 
  The development of legal precedent is fundamentally a competition of ideas between 
opposing parties, with the court as the arbiter.  The contribution of this paper is our view that 
legal precedent is a production function not simply of the court, but of the parties themselves.  
In this respect, the current legal system is a de facto public-private venture.  The public finances 
the courts (e.g., courts, judges, administrative staff); private parties finance their cases before the 
courts.  While there has been considerable attention given to the importance of public funding 
of the judicial system (Breyer, 2003), by comparison there is relatively little attention to the 
funding of litigation itself.  Although outside this paper, we believe litigation costs are worth 
closer examination.  Parties, through their lawyers, produce these ideas.  The cost of production 
is non-trivial, however, and in many instances, substantial.  Unfortunately, parties vary – often 
dramatically – in resources, which affect their ability to produce arguments. 
  One potential implication of this paper is a critique of the current system of legal 
representation.  In both the criminal and civil context, parties are largely responsible for 
financing their own legal representation.  The U.S. Constitution qualifies this norm in the 
criminal system by providing free legal representation for indigent defendants.  This provision, 
however, mitigates but does not eliminate issues of resource allocation and costs: it is widely 
believed that prosecutors have more legal resources than public defenders or court-appointed 
counsel.  In the civil context, no such constitutional protections exist for indigent parties, let 
alone those of moderate means. 
  If we believe that parties’ resources influence how courts make decisions, and that 
resources vary among litigants – often in significant and systematic ways – then it logically 
follows that the allocation of resources influences the development of legal precedent.  This 
statement is the essence of our model.  The efficacy of parties’ self-financing their legal costs 
depends in large part on their possessing the resources to effectively present their arguments.  
This reliance seems at odds with what we often observe with actual litigation.  A recurring Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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criticism of the legal system is that it consistent favors wealthy parties (Meeker & Dombrink, 
1993).  This paper shows how legal precedent, without any bias or prejudice by the court, may 
nonetheless favor wealthier parties. Startz & Yoon, Model of Judicial Precedent 
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Appendix 
 
The parameter w is the strength of the gravitational pull of S*, where cost is inversely 







−w  (1) 
 
Since w>0, the further L is from S*, the lower the cost and the greater the attraction towards S*.  
Formally: 
 
  (2) 
 
What do different levels of w do?  Formally: 
 
  (3) 
 
(Note that ln|L – S*|<0 for |L-S*|<1). 
  As w , the denominator goes to 1, and the gravity effect disappears.  As w , the 
change in the denominator gets larger the further the law is from S*.  Formally, 
 
  (4) 
 
As written, w means high costs.  More importantly, it means that gravity is important: if w is 
large, then costs fall rapidly the further the law is from S*.  As a result, the pull towards S* is 
greater. 